In key-recovery methods using smart cards, a user can recover the disk encryption key in cooperation with the system administrator, even if the user has lost the smart card including the disk encryption key. However, the disk encryption key is known to the system administrator in advance in most key-recovery methods. Hence user's disk data may be read by the system administrator. Furthermore, if the disk encryption key is not known to the system administrator in advance, it is difficult to achieve a key authentication. In this paper, we propose a scheme which enables to recover the disk encryption key when the user's smart card is lost. In our scheme, the disk encryption key is not preserved anywhere and then the system administrator cannot know the key before key-recovery phase. Only someone who has a user's smart card and knows the user's password can decrypt that user's disk data. Furthermore, we measured the processing time required for user authentication in an experimental environment using a virtual machine monitor. As a result, we found that this processing time is short enough to be practical. key words: user authentication, key recovery, smart card
Introduction
Information leakage has recently become a serious problem. Because a user's disk might contain a lot of confidential information, it should be encrypted and the disk encryption key is protected securely. Hence, it is important not only to encrypt the disk data but also to store the disk encryption key securely. Disk security has been improved by storing the encryption key in a hardware token such as a smart card or USB device. We need to have some methods to recover the disk encryption key when the token is lost. For example, it is necessary to keep a backup copy in a safe place such as another key management server.
In key-recovery methods using smart cards, a user can recover the disk encryption key in cooperation with the system administrator, even if the user has lost the smart card including the disk encryption key. However, the disk encryption key is known to the system administrator in advance in most key-recovery methods. Hence user's disk data may be read by the system administrator. Furthermore, if the disk encryption key is not known to the system administrator in advance, it is difficult to achieve a key authentication. † † The author is with University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba-shi 305-8573 Japan.
* The preliminary version of this paper was presented at ITNG'08 [1] .
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In this paper, we propose a scheme which enables to recover the disk encryption key when the user's smart card is lost. In our scheme, the disk encryption key is not preserved anywhere and then the system administrator cannot know the key before key-recovery phase. Only someone who has a user's smart card and knows the user's password can decrypt that user's disk data. Hence, our scheme enables a user to not only prevent user's disk data from being stolen from user's PC but also recover his disk encryption key without his smart card. Furthermore, we measured the processing time required for user authentication in an experimental environment using a virtual machine monitor. As a result, we found that this processing time is short enough to be practical.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we briefly review some related works. We then in Sect. 3 explain our preliminaries, in Sect. 4 describe our scheme in detail, and in Sect. 5 present the results of an experimental evaluation of our scheme. In Sect. 6 we discuss our scheme and in Sect. 7 we conclude by briefly summarizing the paper.
Related Work
BitLocker Drive Encryption is a security feature integrated into the Windows Vista operating system for full disk encryption [2] . It works in combination with a TPM chip that encrypts the key used in encryption and saves the encrypted key on the disk. The Secure File System [3] , on the other hand, provides filesystem-level encryption.
A lot of authentication schemes based on smart cards have been proposed recently [4] - [8] . In them a user's secret information that is shared with servers is stored in the user's smart card. It is protected by a password and by the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. There is also a scheme that improves security by combining the use of a smart card and the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) [9] .
Several papers about key recovery have been published [10] - [14] . Of the four kinds of key recovery methods (key escrow, trusted third party, commercial key backup and key encapsulation), key encapsulation is the only one in which the key is not known to the system administrator [11] , [12] . When key encapsulation is used, however, it is hard to confirm that the recovered key is the legitimate user's key because the system administrator does not know the key in advance. This means that the encryption key can be recovered by a malicious user inside the system. Although we can easily consider a method that uses the key with a cerCopyright c 2010 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers tificate, in that case the key would be known to the system administrator in advance.
Key-recovery methods using a smart card have been proposed [13] , [14] , but they are fundamentally different from the one in our scheme. Although the disk encryption key in [13] is not stored anywhere as well as our scheme, it does not consider the security against the system administrator, hence the system administrator can always compute the disk encryption key which is distributed to the smart card and the card reader. In [14] , the smart card with the tamperresistance is turned over to an escrow agent for safekeeping. These approaches are different from ours.
There is also a method in which secret keys are managed safely by using blind signatures and passwords [15] . In that method a user's secret key is encrypted by the value of the blind signature and the source of the signature is encrypted by the password. Both the encrypted key and the encrypted source are kept on a local disk. This double encryption protects the password from brute force attacks.
Preliminaries

Requirements
In this section, we describe some requirements of our scheme.
• Weakened authority. Although system administrators have high access authority, they should not know the disk encryption keys of users because they may not be authorized to read a user's sensitive information. Thus, it is important not to leak a private data to the system administrator.
• Authenticated recovery of disk encryption key. If the disk encryption key is known to the system administrator in advance, we can achieve a key authentication. Otherwise, it is difficult to achieve the key authentication. Although there are also some methods in which the user's disk encryption key need not be known to the system administrator in advance, with them it is difficult to ensure that a key can be recovered only by the legitimate user. We therefore want to conduct an authenticated recovery without letting the system administrator know the disk encryption key in advance.
Full Disk Encryption
There are two kinds of disk encryption: full disk encryption, in which all the byte data on the disk is encrypted; and filesystem-level encryption, in which what are encrypted are the files or directories on the disk [16] . We employ full disk encryption. An advantage of full disk encryption is that everything, including the swap space and the temporary files, is encrypted and the decision of which files to encrypt is not left to users [16] . Our scheme uses a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES because it is a high-security algorithm and can encrypt/decrypt a disk quickly. In a full disk encryption, the OS is encrypted in a hard disk. So some program would start up the OS by decrypting the hard disk data.
Definition and Assumption
We define function to break the Computational DiffieHellman (CDH) assumption over Z n [17] .
Assumption 1: CDH over Z n in Definition 1 is stronger than or equivalnet to the RSA.
Our Scheme
In this section, we explain the detailed protocol of our scheme.
Notations
In this description of the notations used in our scheme, |n| and |n i | are assumed to be more than 1024 bits. : Cryptographic secure hash function (e.g., SHA1)
Entities
We explain three entities in our scheme (see Fig. 1 )
• STTP. We assume a semi-trusted third party (STTP). The STTP stands for the system administrator and the trusted server (i.e. the STTP server). The STTP server is managed by the system administrator. The STTP sets up the scheme, registers a user U i , issues cert i and CRL, and recovers lost encryption keys. The STTP has user's information (user identity, cert i , R a i b i mod n i and R d i mod n i ), CERT , CRL and her RSA keys (e, d, n) on her own storage. Since the STTP is "honest-butcurious", the preserved user information may be leaked by the STTP.
• Smart card. A smart card is a hardware token which stores the disk encryption key. It is also an identification card such as an employee ID card or a student identification card. Hence the disk encryption key is linked to the user's identity. Thus, only a specific user who has the smart card is able to start up the OS in the user's client PC. The smart card is used for generating the key and for user authentication. Our scheme therefore generates the disk encryption key with the help of a smart card. We also assume that a PKI such as remote authentication is used with the smart card. The private key, the public key, the public key certificate, and the signature calculation software in the public key cryptosystem are stored in this card. User's RSA keys and user's certificate are stored in this card.
• Client PC. A client PC is used by a user and can connect directly with a smart card. While the user's OS is stored in an encrypted storage of a client PC, some information of R a i b i mod n i , (a i b i ) e mod n, CERT and CRL is stored in a non-encrypted storage of a client PC.
Premises
The premises of our scheme are these:
1. The STTP is "honest-but-curious": the STTP prevents the information stored in its database from being falsified, but may leak user's secret information such as the disk encryption key. 2. The STTP can freely alter the data in user's smart card by using the STTP's privileged password, but the STTP cannot read that data. 3. The STTP is not attacked. 4. The smart card is tamper resistant, and the confidential information is not stolen from the smart card itself or while it is being transferred between the smart card and the client PC. 5. The calculation algorithms (e.g., signature generation) in the smart card are not falsified. 6. The access password of the smart card is not cracked because the smart card is locked when a user input a wrong password more than the predetermined frequency. 7. A client PC has non-encrypted storage where some data and programs required for the OS booting are stored. 8. A client PC is not cracked by a malicious STTP. In other words, the STTP does not spy on any user's information in the client PC. 9. A client PC connected with the smart card which has completed user authentication is not stolen. 10. A user can read data other than his private key in his smart card by using his password, but he cannot alter any data except for his password. 11. A user has the private key only in his smart card.
Protocol Description
The protocol in our scheme is composed of the following six phases.
• System setup phase. When the STTP starts our scheme, she executes this phase. The STTP generates its RS A keys, CERT , and CRL. It also generates the random numbers R ∈ Z * n that are the common public information of the system. A user installs some programs concerning the registration phase and the localauthentication phase to non-encrypted storage.
• Registration phase (1). When the STTP registers a user, she executes the registration phases (1) and (2). The user U i connects his smart card with the STTP server and initializes the card (see Fig. 2 • Registration phase (2). U i directly connects the client PC to the STTP server, and makes information that is necessary for the key recovery (see Fig. 3 ). The communication between a client PC and the STTP is a secure channel using RSA signature in public key infrastructure. At first, the STTP sends CERT , CRL and R to the client PC. The client PC stores CERT , CRL and R in its own non-encrypted storage after it checks these values. Then, the client PC selects a random a i < |n|/2, computes R a i mod n i , and sends it to the STTP server. On the other hand, the STTP selects a random b i < |n|/2, computes (R • Local authentication phase. When a user uses a client PC, this local authentication phase and the following key-generation phase are executed before the OS booting. The client PC confirms the validity of the smart card in this phase. We can confirm that the smart card was legitimately issued by the STTP. The procedure is shown in Fig. 4 procedure.
1. The client PC derives the legitimate disk encryption key sk i of size |n i | by calculating c d i /r i mod n i :
2. The client PC divides the disk encryption key sk i by the block size of the symmetric-key encryption algorithm, and then uses some chopped keys from the head of byte data of sk i , which is shown in practice as follows: sk i = sk i1 ||sk i2 || · · · , where || denotes concatenation. The first chopped key is sk i1 . For instance, when the symmetric-key encryption algorithm is AES-128, you can obtain eight disk encryption keys because |n i | =1024 bits. In this case you use only the first key, sk i1 .
• Key-recovery phase. When you accidentally lose your smart card or your password, you execute the keyrecovery phase by connecting your client PC with the new smart card to the STTP server directly (see Fig. 5 ). This new smart card is used for user authentication. U i has to obtain the new smart card from a system administrator before starting key-recovery phase. (2) again. Finally, the STTP adds the previous certificate cert i to CRL.
Experiment
Our scheme uses a smart card with a low processing ability, so its processing time might be long because two kinds of phases (the local authentication phase and the keygeneration phase) are executed every time the client PC is used. We therefore measured the processing time required for each function in both phases in order to confirm that the smart card can complete the processing within a reasonable time.
For a full disk encryption, it is necessary for a program to decrypt the disk data before booting up the OS. We use a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) as this program. The VMM encrypts/decrypts the disk data by using it own encryption engine by which the disk access data is compulsorily hooked. After the smart card is authenticated, the client PC acquires the disk encryption key and then boots up the OS on the VMM. The values of (a i b i ) e mod n and (R d i a i b i ) mod n i are saved to the non-encrypted storage that the VMM manages. We used as the client PC a ThinkPad X60 (CPU: Core 2 Duo 2 GHz, Memory: 1 GB), used as the smart card an eL-WISE (NTT Communications), and used as the smart card reader an ASE drive IIIE (Athena Smartcard Solutions). This smart card is equipped with a CPU, RAM and ROM, and corresponds to PKCS#11. We used Linux Fedora Core 6 as a host OS and Windows XP as a guest OS. The software we used was a smart card library group, the encryption library OpenSSL 0.9.8 b, the multiple-precision arithmetic library GMP 4.1.4-9, and the virtual machine monitor QEMU 0.8.2.
In the local authentication phase and the keygeneration phase, we measured the processing time for the six items listed in Table 1 . The six items are processed in both phases. Items 1 and 4 were executed in the smart card, and the others were executed in the VMM. The measurement was conducted by inserting the gettimeofday function in the VMM. We assume that the timer of VMM is correct. Each of the times for the items listed in Table 1 is the average of five measurements. The total time is discussed in Sect. 6.
The processing times for acquiring the user's public key certificate and for generating the blind signature were both comparatively long, and that for acquiring the public key certificate was the longest. Additionally, the processing time for generating the blind signature contains not only the calculation but also the transfer of the signature data. That is, the transfer between the smart card and the client PC took longer than the signature calculation in the smart card. The discussion related to the experimental results will be conducted in Sect. 6.
Discussion
Protection of Disk Data
We assume that a malicious STTP and a non-STTP adversary try to acquire U i 's disk encryption key sk i . 
Revocation of Disk Encryption Key
The STTP can revoke the RSA private key d i by using the CRL. The disk encryption key includes user's private key d i . Therefore the STTP can revoke U i 's disk encryption key by revoking d i . As a result, the user whose disk encryption key is revoked cannot decrypt his disk data even with his smart card. Of course, he cannot also use the PKI authentication with the same card after revocation. Note that it is necessary to have the CRL stored in the client PC updated.
Time until the OS has Booted Up
The time until the OS has booted up is the total time required for the local authentication phase, the key-generation phase, and the OS booting. Our experimental results showed that execute both the local authentication phase and the keygeneration phase took about 2.6 seconds. On the other hand, booting up the OS (Windows XP) on the QEMU took about 60 seconds on the same machine. So the processing time for both phases was less than 5% of the time required for booting up the OS. We therefore think that the time which is required for both phases is short enough to be practical.
Length of Disk Encryption Key
The standardization of full disk encryption is discussed in [18] , [19] . In these documents, two kinds of standardization of narrow-block encryption and wide-block encryption are advanced at the same time. In these standardizations, some encryption modes are elected as a candidate. Among these modes the key length of XTS mode and TET mode is two block lengths and the key length of EME* mode is three block lengths. Hence the mechanism of our scheme is meaningful because it generates the disk encryption key of two or more block lengths.
Conclusion
We proposed a scheme which enables to recover the disk encryption key when the user's smart card is lost. In our scheme, the disk encryption key is not preserved anywhere and then the STTP cannot know the key before key-recovery phase. Furthermore, we showed in experiments that it took about 2.6 seconds for the smart card to execute both the local authentication phase and the key-generation phase. Both phases are used every time the OS boots up. This time is a short time compared with the OS booting time. Therefore, we found that this processing time is short enough to be practical.
In our key-recovery phase, the disk encryption key is exposed to the STTP. Hence the security against semihonest STTP seems weak. We would like to execute the keyrecovery phase without exposing the disk encryption key to the STTP as a future work.
